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PEACE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF JAPAN'S
CONSTITUTION
LAWRENCE W. BEER*
I. INTRODUCrION
With her defeat fifty years ago in the Second World War, Japan
stopped shooting. Japan has never begun shooting again. That fact, by
itself, is remarkable for a twentieth-century great power in Asia.
Among all the world powers, Japan's record since 1945 has been the
most distinctively peaceful, in compliance with ideals of international
law and morality and of the United Nations, but also in compliance with
the legal requirements of what Japanese call their "Peace Constitution."
My contentions here are that Japan's practice of quasi-pacifism under
Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan for a half-century represents
an original and valuable contribution to the thought and practice of con-
stitutionalism in world civilization. In addition, the end of the Cold
War, the USSR, and colonialism have made the Japanese model appear
less utopian and more usefully suggestive for some other countries than
was true in the past.
There are inconsistencies between the ideals of Article 9 and certain
elements in Japan's defense system, and in the old Liberal Democratic
Party which ruled from 1955 until 1993, numerous leaders opposed the
Constitution's demands. Nevertheless, the anti-pacifists have been
blocked repeatedly in their efforts to ignore or change Article 9, and in
substantive practices Japan now provides an anti-militarist example of
what is not only desirable but now possible and advisable for many na-
tion states. Japan's record shbws that peace, security, and great power
status need not depend heavily on military power, and that war or quick
belligerent responses to foreign provocations in violation of interna-
* Fred Morgan Kirby Professor of Civil Rights Emeritus, Lafayette College, Easton,
Pennsylvania. Portions of this paper were originally presented at the Fourth World Congress
of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Tokyo, 1995.
1. I use "quasi-pacifism" because a consistent pacifist position denies a right to self-
defense whether in personal conflicts, domestic public affairs or international relations; the
Japanese position applies only to international relations, and law allows self-defense.
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tional law is not a common sense necessity for national security. Geo-
political factors and the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States
(1960)2 has eased the pursuit of pacifism in the decades since 1945; but
Japan's history and the continued resistance of some nationalistic Japa-
nese leaders to recognize the nature of her barbaric aggression in war-
time Asia suggest that a revival of the military's ascendancy was more
likely than what happened-a decisive renunciation of war and political
militarism, opposition to nuclear weapons, unique restraints on military
spending, military activities, and weapons trade, and unmatched Official
Development Act (ODA) support for non-military development efforts
in the non-West and for ecological protection.3
Bear in mind that no modem or current world power was more ag-
gressively militaristic or culturally more adulatory of military virtues
than Japan before August 15, 1945. Moreover, Japan had quickly
learned in the nineteenth century that it was not the great civilizational
power of Western Christianity, art, philosophy, science, business, or
technology that lay behind Western dominance in the past few centu-
ries. Most immediately, it was military power, military force brought to
bear on the entire non-Western world, and earlier on Latin America.
Beginning with the United States in the 1850s, Western powers forced
Japan to sign unequal treaties. As a result, Japan's primary task in the
second half of the nineteenth century-as she worked towards inde-
pendence from unequal treaties and a place of pride in the world-was
to achieve military parity with Western powers. There was simply no
alternative. This is not to underplay the importance of other elements
in Japan's first modernization in government, law, education, technol-
ogy, and economy-but to stress their instrumental nature in relation to
the sine qua non of military capacity. Nor is it to condone Japan's mili-
2. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Treaty No. 6, June 23, 1960. For the text
of the treaty, see HIROSHI ITOH & LAWRENCE W. BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW
OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70 104-05 (1978).
3. Ryuji Mukae, Japan's Diet Resolution on World War Two: Keeping History at Bay, 36
ASIAN SURVEY 1011 (No. 10) October 1996. In June, 1995 the House of Representatives
passed its first formal war apology ever. Of 511 members, only 230 supported the Resolution;
the 171 members of the opposition New Frontier Party (Shinshintb) and 70 members of the
three coalition government parties absented themselves from the vote. This was the first time
in more than twenty years that a Diet resolution had been passed in the absence of a major
opposition party. A good number of prominent politicians are still unable to admit any
wrongdoing in Japan's militarist period behavior, to the consternation of other Asian coun-
tries and the world. On this problem, see Resolution Is Blot on History, JAPAN TIMES
WEEKLY INT'L ED., June 19-25, 1995, at 30. On August 15, 1995, Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama, at ceremonies commemorating the end of the Second World War, made a formal
apology for Japan's aggressions. ASAHI SHIMBUN, August 15 (evening ed.) 1995 at 1.
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tant nationalist extremes in Asia, especially between 1930-1945. 4 How-
ever, it would be chauvinistic hypocrisy to condemn Japan's militarism
without taking adequate notice of the military barbarism at the founda-
tion of Western dominance of Asia.
In 1998, over fifty years after the worst system-failure in its long his-
tory, Japan continues to insist on the ultimate bankruptcy not only of its
own previous-nationalist militarism but of ideological, nationalist, and
ethnicist militarism wherever it occurs on all continents. The militariza-
tion of America's political culture during the Cold War, and the great
costs of warring to the United States, Japan's only ally, in the past thirty-
five years have not increased Japan's trust in military solutions; but Ja-
pan does pay most of the cost of maintaining a few United States bases
in Japan.
In the rest of this essay I Will try to explain why Japan became anti-
militarist, then how Article 9-the "no war clause"-has affected Japa-
nese law, policy, and national attitudes, and finally what lessons, if any,
Japan's experience suggests for constitutionalist restraints on militarism
in government, law, and policy.
II. THE IMAGERY OF JAPAN'S CONSTITUTIONALISM
To understand Japan's constitutional pacifism, and indeed its consti-
tutionalism as a whole, it is essential to take into account the radical re-
action to pain and failure Japanese suffered under the three-part, inte-
grated constitutional system during "the dark valley period" (1930-
1945).' From the 1860s on, Japan's able leaders worked systematically
to unite a feudally divided people into a nation of subjects passionately
loyal to the manipulated Emperor (Tenn6) and his increasingly repres-
sive and militarist state. This modem Emperor system differed pro-
foundly from the ancient, weak traditional institution. Modem means
of mass education and indoctrination-as well as legal, police, and ad-
ministrative controls-were used over many decades to create an exqui-
sitely authoritarian, militarist, and nationalist government whose every
action was legitimized by legal and quasi-mystical reference to the state
4. See generally RACHELLE LINNER, CITY OF SILENCE: LISTENING TO HIROSHIMA
(1995); GEORGE HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN (1994); SHELDON HARRIS, FACTORIES OF
DEATH: JAPAN'S SECRET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROJECTS IN MANCHURIA AND CHINA,
1932-1945 (1993); HARUKO TAYA COOK & THEODORE F. COOK, JAPAN AT WAR, AN
ORAL HISTORY (1992).
5. The suffering Japan caused others was not an important factor to many Japanese until
later. In 1998, a rather small minority of Japanese were still uncritical of Japan's wartime be-
havior.
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sovereignty of a benevolent suprahuman Emperor. Virtual annihilation
of self in service to the Emperor-State was the ideal.
Beginning in September, 1945, in the first months of the Allied oc-
cupation of Japan (1945-1952), and culminating with the promulgation
of the Constitution of Japan on November 3, 1946, the wartime system
combining the Emperor, the military, and repression of the individual
yielded to a new tripartite constitutional system in which the people are
sovereign, the state is pacifist,7 and respect for the individual's freedom
and other human rights is the government's prime directive.8 What has
gradually become institutionalized is one of the world's most stable and
peaceful democratic states with a Constitution as its most widely trusted
and respected national institution.9 Of some 180 single-document na-
tional constitutions in the world, Japan's is one of only about twenty
ratified before 1950 (roughly 130 current constitutions were ratified
since 1970)." In studying Japan's vigorous constitutional debates since
1947, it has been important to remember that any tampering with one of
the three elements of the system-a powerless Emperor (or better,
"King"), pacifism, and human rights-has been commonly seen as a
possibly dangerous attempt to alter the other two components of the
system.1 Thus, if the Emperor were to be "restored" to his nominal su-
prahuman and manipulable status, it would bode ill for human rights
and pacifism. If the military gained significant political influence, dimi-
nution of rights and popular sovereignty might ensue. State weakness in
enforcing human rights might encourage right-wing militarist national-
ism. For many, the three links have been inseparable. This imagery has
been crucial to Japan's psychological pacifism.
Although buttressed by religious and philosophical ideas of East and
West both before and since 1945,12 Japan's pacifism grew-less from
ideas than as a reaction to historic national tragedy-into a powerful
6. NIHONKOKU KEMPO, preamble and article 1.
7 Id. at preamble and article 9.
8 Id. at articles 11-14 and 97.
9. See generally JAMES S. MARSHALL, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY, JAPAN'S SUCCESSOR GENERATION (1985); Lawrence Beer, The
Present Constitutional System of Japan, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY ASIA (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992).
10. Information provided by Albert P. Blaustein, 1995.
11. On constitutional revisionism in Japan, see LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 at 3-66 (1996).
12. FUKASE TADAKAZU, SENSO HOKI To HEIWATEKI SEIZONKEN [RENUNCIATION
OF WAR AND THE RIGHT TO A LIFE IN PEACE] (1987); PACIFISM IN THE JAPANESE
CHRISTIAN AND SOCIALIST TRADITION (Nobuya Bamba & John F. Howes, eds. 1978).
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force in Japan's society, politics, law, and foreign relations. Whatever its
causes and history, and however hotly debated its theory and practice,
this quasi-pacifism and Japan's long maintenance of peace are matters
of justifiable national pride. Nationalistic favoritism toward Shinto
shrines shown by the visits of some politicians to honor the war dead
still causes concern about separation of religion, the state, and the re-
ligious rights of others.13 However, in 1998, the Emperor had become
less a part of the constitutional imagery problem than his father Em-
peror Horihito was, and the Supreme Court had held unconstitutional
local government funding of Shinto shrines to the war dead. The attrac-
tive Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko are not a symbol of impe-
rial militarist resurgence in constitutional discourse, but a model nuclear
family and consensus symbol of the "unity of the people"'14 (Article I of
the Constitution), that is, of the community coherence of the Japanese."5
Emperor Akihito has been straightforwardly supportive of the Constitu-
tion, while Hirohito was silent over many years. And citizens would
rather have the internationalist Emperor seen as representative of con-
temporary Japan than most Prime Ministers.
The core of constitutional imagery is now the relationship between
Article 9 and human rights. National consensus does not come easily;
but the primary text is Article 9.
III. THE EFFECrS OF ARTICLE 9
Article 9 of Japan's Constitution reads as follows:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of
settling international disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.
In addition, the Preamble of the Constitution proclaims:
We, the Japanese people,... [are] resolved that never again shall
13. See DAVID O'BRIEN, To DREAM OF DREAMS: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN POS'TVAR JAPAN (1996).
14. KENPO, article 1.
15. Discussions in Tokyo, July and August, 1995 and 1997, by the author with authorita-
tive constitutional lawyers Shigemitsu Dando, Masami Ito, Hideo Shimizu, Nobuyoshi
Ashibe, Naoki Kobayashi, Yoichi Higuchi, Hidenori Tomatsu, and Isao Sato. See also
KENPO, article 9.
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we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of gov-
ernment .... [We] ... desire peace for all time and... an hon-
ored place in an international society striving for the preserva-
tion of peace.., free from fear and want."
The present Constitution of Japan came into effect on May 3, 1947,
and has never been amended. Amendment requires the approval of
two-thirds of all members of each house of the Diet and by a majority of
those voting in a special referendum. No political party has ever had the
votes necessary for amendment, and based on the above-described im-
agery, amendment of Article 9 has been too controversial a project for
political party comfort. Amendment proposals from outside the gov-
ernment continue to appear spasmodically-for example, the Yomiuri
Shimbun document published in late 1994."7 In 1998, many
"revisionists" support the clauses renouncing "war as a sovereign right
of the nation" and "the threat or use of force" for dispute resolution.
Paragraph 2 disallowing armament has been the main focus of contro-
versy.
Although swept aside by wars, the too-often-forgotten 1928 Kellogg-
Briand Pact, ratified by Japan, the United States, Germany, the United
Kingdom, the USSR, and other countries, outlawed war and technically
was never revoked. Since the 1950s, Japan has gradually developed a
military capacity; although the costs are high, the Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) are quite modest compared to those of neighboring countries. As
noted by James Auer, the leading military analyst of Article 9's implica-
tions, Japan "simultaneously has attempted to live up to the ideals of the
Constitution to a degree that the other signatories of the Kellogg-Briand
pact never have.' 8 Other nations might well formally adopt a renuncia-
tion of the threat or use of force to settle international disputes in their
constitutions and statements of basic foreign policy.
16. KENPO, preamble. On the writing of the Constitution of Japan, see SHOICHI
KOSEKI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION (Ray A. Moore ed. & trans.,
1997). In February, 1946, Colonel Charles Kades, Deputy Chief, Government Section in the
Allied Occupation apparatus, drafted Article 9, but the final text was based on both Japanese
(Kijuro Shidehara) and American (Douglas MacArthur and Courtney Whitney) influences.
The text was debated by the House of Representatives elected in April 1946, and was ap-
proved 421-8. The 1947 Constitution of Japan was ratified according to the amendment
processes of the Meiji Constitution (Constitution of the Empire of Japan), 1889-1947. BEER,
supra note 9, at 175-182.
17. THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN, A PROPOSAL FOR THE REVISION OF THE TEXT OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN (1994).
18. James E. Auer, Article 9: Renunciation of War, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 69-86 (Percy R. Luney & Kazuyaki Takahashi eds. 1993).
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What differences has Article 9 made in law and policy? Japan's
broader foreign policies and internal law and politics have buttressed
Article 9 pacifism. In constitutional and related law, a number of court
decisions, including Supreme Court decisions, have kept alive and sali-
ent over many years the great issues of peace, militarism, and armament
for the Japanese public. The repeated presence of Article 9 questions
before the judiciary, amply discussed in the scholarly literature and mass
media, has reaffirmed the legitimacy of raising and pursuing significant
issues which would be quickly dismissed elsewhere as dealing with le-
gally untouchable acts of State or "political questions."
The Supreme Court has held that under Article 9 Japan retains the
natural law right to self-defense, 9 that the Japan-United States Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security (1960) is not on its face unconstitu-
tional,0 and that, although generally the Court must take into account
the political nature of such issues, that Court retains the right to deter-
mine whether a law or other government action is clearly and obviously
in violation of Article 9.2 The Court has yet to decide directly whether
or not the SDF are constitutional; but in the famous Naganuma Nike
Missile Site Case, the Sapporo District Court in 1973, later reversed by
the Sapporo High Court and the Supreme Court on technical grounds,
did hold the SDF unconstitutional.'
Until 1994, when it joined the reorganized Liberal Democratic Party
in a coalition government, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (Nihon
Shakaitd) was the largest opposition party and consistently maintained
that the SDF were unconstitutional. In July, 1994, Socialist Prime Min-
ister Tomiichi Murayama announced before the Diet a party policy
change: a minimum level of military capacity for self-defense is consti-
tutional.2 The general public accepts as constitutional a modest SDF
whose main purpose is disaster relief rather than defense, but opposes
19. Japan v. Sakata et al; Sup. Ct. G.B., Dec. 16, 1959; 13 KEISHO 13 at 3225, translated
in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT & CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 298 (1964).
20. Japan v. Sakane et.al.; Sup. Ct. G.B., Apr. 2, 1969; 23 KEISHO 5 at 685, translated in
ITOH & BEER, supra note 2, at 103.
21. Ito et. al. v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Sapporo Dist. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973;
712 HANREI JIHO No. 712, at 24, translated in BEER & ITOH, supra note 11 at 83; Minister of
Agriculture and Forestry v. Ito et. al.; Sapporo High Ct., Aug. 5 1976; 27 GYOSAI REISHU 8,
at 1175, translated in BEER & ITOH, supra note 11, at 112; Uno et. al. v. Minister of Agricul-
ture and Forestry; Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Sept. 9,1982; 36 MINSHU 9 at 1679, translated in BEER &
ITOH, supra note 11, at 130.
22. Ito et. al. v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Sapporo Dist. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973;
712 HANREI JIHo No. 712, at 24, translated in BEER & ITOH, supra note 11 at 83
23. ASAHI SHIMBUN, July 20-22, 1994.
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substantial growth in the military and overseas fighting by the SDF. The
great majority of constitutional lawyers still do not recognize any SDF
as constitutional. It is critically important to realize that relatively few
Japanese have felt Japan has been under any credible foreign threat that
would make its pacifist approach obviously unrealistic. The common
presupposition of most governments that a military is essential because
all states are under threat is now empirically questionable.
Many of those accepting the SDF and the right to military self-
defense limit the right to fight to Japan's territory. The suggestion that
the SDF should guard the sea lanes outward from Japan for 1,000 miles
has been hotly contested. The more common position with respect to
Japanese involvement in overseas peace-keeping operations ("PKO") is
that they be under United Nations auspices, that Japan's participation
must be welcomed by the parties to cease-fire arrangements as a neutral
party, that Japanese SDF personnel may use firearms (restricted to
small arms) only to prevent injury or death, and that Japanese participa-
tion will stop if the cease-fire is broken. 4 Up to 2,000 SDF personnel
may be abroad at any given time; each deployment must be approved by
the Diet beforehand, except in cases of humanitarian rescue and relief.'
The above are among the matters clarified by the Peace-Keeping
Operations Law (1992) after fierce Diet debate on the appropriate ways
for Japan to respond, if at all, to the international belligerency of the
Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the United States, United Nations, and
"coalition forces" responses in the Persian Gulf War. As elsewhere,
there was no consensus (e.g., the United States Senate approved United
States actions by one vote) in Japan that the Persian Gulf War was nec-
essary and morally justified (up to 150,000 lives were lost, the majority
civilian). There was also no consensus that Japan's $13 billion contribu-
tion was appropriate, or that foreign criticism of Japan's unwillingness
to kill and be killed in military actions was called for.26
24. Under the Security Treaty with the United States, it is not clear whether Japan has
an obligation to take action in defense of the United States except within the territorial wa-
ters of Japan; but RIMPAC military exercises in a larger area have made this limitation more
ambiguous since the 1980s. Under new "Guidelines" for cooperation in 1998, many practical
details for United States-Japan cooperation during emergency situations (e.g., national disas-
ter, war) were to be implemented by new law.
25. In the Great Hanshin Earthquake Disaster (Kobe) of 1995, which took over 6,300
lives, the SDF lent assistance under law requiring it to act on the request of the local execu-
tives.
26. Japan's dispatch of four minesweepers and two support vessels to the Persian Gulf in
1991 after the war was her first overseas military deployment since the Second World War,
with one little-known exception during the Korean Conflict in 1950. Auer, supra note 17, at
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But the Persian Gulf War triggered prolonged national debate on
how Japan should fulfill its international responsibilities as one of the
world's leaders, preferably by non-military means. In the course of her
varied contributions to the United Nations operation in Cambodia in
1992, the largest such United Nations effort ever, two Japanese lost their
lives (the father of one volunteered to replace his son); 600 SDF people,
75 police, and 40 election monitors were sent to Cambodia. In 1998,
many Japanese opposed Japan's participation in overseas fighting, even
under United Nations sponsorship. 7 Clearly, Japan's unique security
psychology and policies will not lead to proportionate and adequate re-
sponse to all cases of international belligerency or intervention for pro-
tection of human rights and lives. They are premised on the belief and
hope that the United Nations will be allowed by the great powers and
small nations to develop more adequate peace-keeping capacities and
institutions. Yet, Japan is a far more responsible world citizen in refus-
ing to be violent than are those many nations (some with bloated arms
industries) quick to seek military solutions and slow and uncreative in
using forceful non-military means such as political and economic sanc-
tions to resolve international disputes. The Japanese pacifist principle is
that they should not shoot humans and should not, and probably will
not, be shot at. This radical position deserves wider study and adoption
in some form by other countries which, like Japan, are not demonstrably
under specific external threat requiring substantial military response ca-
pabilities.
In Japan, military interests are not presumed to be a high priority, let
alone the highest priority. Given the central importance of constitu-
tional rights in Japanese law, one cannot presume that property rights or
civil liberties and other "rights and freedoms of the spirit" (seishinteki
jiyaken) may be easily subordinated to military interests under any cur-
rently foreseeable security circumstances. ' For example, a Tokyo High
Court decision, which was let stand, held that in peacetime there is not a
higher public interest in the activities of the Defense Agency than in
those of civilian airports or other government agencies. Noise pollution
79. General MacArthur sent over forty minesweepers to Korea in support of the United Na-
tions operation there. lId
27. Symposium, Japan Redefining Its International Role, ASIAN SURVEY, June 1993;
KOKUSAI KYORYOKU To KEMPO [INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE CON-
STITUTION] (Chuma Kiyofuku et. al. eds., 1995).
28. Unlike the German military, the SDF is subject to special restraints on their civil lib-
erties, as are firemen, police, and other categories of public employee (kamuin). LAWRENCE
W. BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN 205-47 (1985).
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is a general public concern, and noise pollution from military aircraft
which violates the personal rights of citizens is not permissible, the
judges held. 9
In a similar spirit, the "Anti-War Property Owners Movement"
(Hansen Jinushi Und5) centered in the small island of Okinawa, where
18% of the best land (58,000 acres) is in United States military bases,
has attempted to acquire small pieces of real estate in order to block fur-
ther government acquisitions or leases of real estate for United States
military facilities. United States bases occupy about 78,000 acres in the
rest of Japan. After the restoration of Japan's sovereignty over Oki-
nawa in 1972, and even after the end of the Cold War, neither the
United States government nor Japan's leaders showed reasonable sensi-
tivity to the extraordinarily disproportionate impositions placed on the
people of Okinawa. Moreover, Okinawans remember the battle of
Okinawa in the Second World War when one-third of Okinawans were
killed, proportionately, the heaviest casualty rate of any area in Japan.
In the absence of specific credible threats, bases in foreign partner terri-
tory should be rigorously kept to a minimum. Base-related damage to
good relations inevitably occurs, even in the best of times. Americans
rarely reflect: How would we feel about enormous Japanese bases adja-
cent to major population centers in any state in our country?
The abduction and rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan school girl by
three United States servicemen on September 4, 1995, galvanized local
and national demands for a reduction of United States troops, a return
of much of Okinawa's base acreage, and a change in the Status of Forces
Agreement with the United States to give Japanese police immediate
custody over suspected United States military felons. Previously, such
suspects were turned over to Japanese authorities only after they had
issued an indictment. The important difference between the meaning of
"indictment" in United States law and "kiso" in Japanese law has always
made this provision doubly inappropriate and offensive. A prosecutor's
kiso is often tantamount to a conviction; when penologically appropri-
ate, formal court trials are avoided with legal technicalities in Japan's
lenient and effective criminal justice system.
The most common Japanese view is that no credible security concern
of the United States or Japan requires the maintenance of current
United States troop levels or base acreage in Okinawa or in Japan gen-
erally. While some high-ranking American officials have persisted
without persuasive explanation to maintain that current levels are im-
29. Tokyo High Court, July 15, 1987; ASAHI SHIMBUN (evening ed.) July 15, 1987.
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perative, at times in the arrogant tones of a long-past Occupation pe-
riod, popular Okinawan Governor Masahide Ota, in November, 1995,
referred to the United States military as "uninvited guests," and refused
Prime Minister Murayama's demand that he sign legal documents forc-
ing land owners to lease 29 acres for United States base usage. Ulti-
mately, the central government prevailed, but significant changes in
base siting were planned. In this writer's view, a drastic cut in Oki-
nawan land used for military purposes would be wise. In determining
appropriate troop levels abroad, the expanding United States military's
ability to move quickly abroad (e.g., in C-17 aircraft) is critically impor-
tant but rarely discussed. As Air Force General Fogelman noted, "This
nation has a unique capability to project power [abroad]. It's something
no other nation can do."' Among the many factors at work in building
undesirable tensions in 1998 was a clash between the militarized Ameri-
can political and economic culture and Japan's quasi-pacifist culture.
The Constitution of Japan contains no provisions relating to acts of
war, such as declaring war or concluding a peace; nor does any article
touch on martial law declarations or preservation of military secrets."
Special law pursuant to Article 6 of the Japan-United States Security
Treaty requires maintenance of secrecy regarding United States weap-
onry." Article 76(2) precludes military courts: "2. No extraordinary
tribunal shall be established nor shall any organ or agency of the Execu-
tive be given final judicial power." 33 A number of efforts to establish a
"State Secrets Law" since the 1980s have failed;' 4 but a "Freedom of In-
formation Law" is needed to heighten Cabinet and SDF public account-
ability, and passage of a Freedom of Information Law is expected in
1:998. (Many local ordinances give access to local government informa-
tion and protect individual privacy). No military person may be a Cabi-
30. Associated Press, Pentagon Plans $18 Billion Expansion of Air Cargo Fleet,
DENVER POST, Nov. 4,1995, at A3.
31. However, under the National Public Employees Law, the Local Public Employees
Law, and the Self-Defense Forces Law, civil servants must not divulge secrets which have
come to their knowledge while performing their duties, whether on active duty or retired.
32. Special Criminal Law to Implement the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America Re-
garding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Forces in Japan (Law 138 of
1952, as amended). For a translation, see JAPAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS AND EDITORS
ASSOCIATION, PRESS LAWS IN JAPAN 10-11 (August, 1993).
33. NIHONKOKU KENP6, ch. VI, art. 76.
34. In part, the efforts to protect secrets with new law resulted from discovery that a To-
shiba company and a Norwegian company had jointly passed on to the USSR a sensitive
technology for milling submarine propellers.
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net member.35 Following the spirit of Article 9, under Articles 13 and
18, military conscription is considered unconstitutional as "involuntary
servitude" (permissible only for crime). A military career does not have
the appeal it has in other countries; legally restricted recruitment quotas
are never met.
Under Article 7 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, the Prime Minister
represents the Cabinet and has supervisory control over the SDF.
There is no independent military command structure, as in earlier mod-
em Japan, but a subordinate Director General of the Defense Agency.'
Under Article 71 of the Police Law, the Prime Minister can declare a
state of "national emergency" upon recommendation of the National
Public Safety Commission and assume direct control over Japan's po-
lice." "National emergency" would include such events as a foreign in-
vasion, a large-scale natural disaster, or a major internal disturbance.
The House of Representatives must approve emergency actions. If that
House is not in session at the time of the emergency, the Cabinet may
call an "emergency session" of the House of Councillors, but actions
then taken are "provisional and.., null and void unless agreed to by the
House of Representatives within" ten days of the opening of the next
Diet session.'
Some government security policies are still much debated, while a
virtual national consensus has emerged regarding others, as Japan has
creatively concretized implementation of Article 9 over the decades.
For example, the "three no-nuclear principles" were approved by a Diet
Resolution in November, 1971, prior to the United States restoration to
Japan of sovereignty over Okinawa. These principles ban Japan's
manufacture, possession or introduction of nuclear weapons, even if po-
tentially hostile neighboring countries should develop nuclear weapons
(e.g., China, North Korea, and Russia), even though Japan's nuclear
power technology is of the highest order. Japan's annually revivified
memories of the unique experience of atom bombs-Hiroshima (August
6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945)-have symbolically strength-
ened the national will to adhere to the demands of Article 9, to oppose
35. NIHONKOKu KEMPo Ch.V, art. 66, reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 11, at 660.
36. PETER J. KATZENSTEIN & NOBUO OKAWARA, JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY
(1993). For a comparison, see OSAMU NISHI, CIVILIAN CONTROL: A COMPARISON
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (1983).
37. KEISATSU HO, Law No. 162 of June 8, 1954, as amended; chapter 6 of the Law deals
with emergencies.
38. NIHONKOKU KEMPo Ch. IV, art. 54, reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 11, at
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all nuclear weapons testing (as with the popular movement in 1995
against purchasing French products in protest against nuclear testing in
the Pacific area) and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to advo-
cate worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the first half of
August 1945, ending with August 15, the day the Second World War
ended, may be seen as the annual anti-war season, with much national
reflection and mourning of the war dead. A valuable tradition.39 In
1997, the Supreme Court forced the Education Ministry to allow men-
tion of the infamous Unit 731 in textbooks. Unit 731 used Chinese citi-
zens in cruel biological weapon experiments during the Second World
War4°.
The export of weapons is prohibited, to Japan's considerable eco-
nomic loss; but some of the high technology Japan has shared with the
United States, under agreements signed in the 1980s, is "dual use" (for
example, essential to the optics technology in civilian products but also
in United States weapons as in the Persian Gulf War). In making deci-
sions on Official Development Aid (ODA) under OECD guidelines, as
the world's leading donor nation Japan claims to look critically at each
recipient country's record with respect to the manufacture and trade of
weapons of mass destruction, environmental protection, human rights,
and democratic government. Unlike the United States, France, Russia,
China and other nations, Japan is not a participant in the high pitched
salesmanship of the world's weapons market. Some Japanese advocate
a full legal ban on both the import and export of weapons."
For decades, Japan has almost always limited its defense expendi-
tures to a maximum of 1% of its GNP. 2 Given the rapid growth since
the 1960s and the present giant size of Japan's GNP, even 1% makes
Japan's military budget one of the largest. But that is misleading. Japan
by itself (i.e., not in combination with its sole military ally, the United
States) is not militarily competitive with its smaller neighbors. 3 In troop
strength, it ranks 25th in the world. In the absence of Article 9, Japan
39. Lightening the mood of August is one of the world's great athletic events, the na-
tional high school baseball tournament in which the winners from all prefectures gather to
compete at Koshien Stadium.
40. See HARRIS, supra note 4.
41. YAMAUCHI TOSHIHIRO, 'BOEI HOSEI [THE "DEFENSE" LEGAL SYSTEM],
JURISUTO, No. 1073, at 18, August 15, 1995. See also, Symposium, Kokusai Koken to Ni-
honkoku Kemp6 [International Contributions and the Constitution of Japan], HOGAKU
KYOSHITSU 6-27, 1995.
42. Auer, supra note 17, at 83-84.
43. Id. at 83-84. Japan has built "a meaningful but limited defense capability, clearly
complementary to rather than autonomously separate from United States military power." Id.
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would likely have become one of the few great, and arguably, nuclear,
military powers. Geopolitics have not only made it easier for Japan to
maintain its pacifist position; they have spared Asia and the world from
a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism.
Finally, mass political education has been a factor in institutionaliz-
ing Japan's quasi-pacifism, just as it has been important to an explana-
tion of why military establishments in many other countries are so sel-
dom questioned. Since the latter 1940s, Japan's mass media and its
educational system at each level have taught the young to respect the
"Peace Constitution," Article 9, human rights, and popular sovereignty.
A foreigner teaching at a university of Japan may be surprised to find
students who are genuinely puzzled at the difficulty many foreigners
have in understanding Japan's abhorrence for war and preference for
peaceful means of settling even the most intractable international dis-
putes. In another context, although other nations may se6 it as rank ir-
responsibility, even cadets of the multi-service academy, the Defense
University (B~ei Daigaku) have in significant numbers resigned upon
graduation, because they have felt SDF might be becoming too "3D";
dirty, difficult, and dangerous. Cadets cannot be legally forced to serve.
After all, war is horror, peace is pleasant. The Preamble capsulized it as
"the right to live in peace, free from fear and want."
IV. SUGGESTIONS FROM THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
Besides conscious choice, historical, geopolitical, economic and so-
ciocultural factors have made Japan's distinctive quasi-pacifism possible.
What useful suggestions for the international relations of other nations
might Japan's fifty-year postwar experience contain? Japan has in prac-
tice and in policy brought to its own international relations and to world
politics a seriously proposed assumption that radical renunciation of war
is not only an acceptable and desirable option, but also an imperative
and realistic option for some countries, large and small.
Second, in effect Japan calls into question the realism, in many coun-
tries and contexts, of assuming that unrestrained military development
and an integrated government-military-industrial complex are necessary
for the national security of large powers. Japan's experience suggests
the uselessness of militarism as a primary basis for international and na-
tional planning, and the importance of economic, democratic, human
rights, and environmental concerns in an adequately comprehensive
concept of national security.
Third, Japan illustrates the possibility of changing from domestic and
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international politics dominated by military leaders and military consid-
erations, to politics decisively subordinating the military to civilian lead-
ers and military priorities to more productive socioeconomic and human
rights needs. Many nations now suffer from military indigestion, but
none is more militarist, more aggressive, or more extreme in its nation-
alism than Japan was until August, 1945. Major peaceful change in a
constitutional culture and system is possible.
Fourth, the fundamental change in Japan's international outlook
over the past fifty years illustrates the educative power of schools, mass
media, law and politics to support democracy and exceptionally peace-
able international behavior.
Fifth, Japan's example of peaceful success stands out in a century
unsurpassed in deranged barbarism with modern weaponry. Japan's
quiet exemplar style of leadership in recent decades in the movement to
reduce and eventually abolish nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
encourages other nations to limit their own military development. Like
Japan, some can join in arms reduction without fear of endangering
their national security.
Sixth, with Article 9 Japan's SDF is a much more modest military
force and sociopolitical influence than it would be without Article 9.
Japan's apparently utopian constitutional provisions against war and
militarism actually make an appreciable difference in legal, political, and
diplomatic practice. Many Japanese take pride in Japan being "an in-
ternational conscientious objector nation" at a time when few feel in-
tense patriotism. "It is no exaggeration to say that in contemporary Ja-
pan anyone who offered to sacrifice his or her life for the country would
be considered crazy."" Although not easy, it may be easier to imagine
Japanese being willing to die for the international community under
United Nations jurisdiction than to envision citizens fighting for a Japa-
nese interest, other than defense against an invasion of Japan.
Be that as it may, promotion of practical pacifism and human rights
can be a salutary counterforce to myopic nationalism (or ethnicism),
militarism, and predatory capitalism in the gradual formation of a more
constitutionalist and civilized world. Japan's peaceful record, stable
government, human resources, economic power, contributions to the
United Nations, and world-leading provision of non-military foreign aid
44. Kazu Ogura, The Rupture Between Japan and the United States: Exploring the
Communication Gap Between a Disoriented People and an Idealistic Empire, in JAPAN'S
POST GULF WAR INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES 47 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs ed., Aug.
1991).
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make it worthy of a permanent seat on the Security Council of the
United Nations. Whether or not Japan has a permanent seat, as part of
the small group of de facto world leaders, Japan will "have to take posi-
tions on how the [United Nations] should deal with crises far from home
on a daily basis."45 It is not clear whether Japan will be willing to deal in
an aggressively peaceful manner with situations least amenable to
peaceful settlement; but Japan should remain a valuable exemplar of the
nonmilitary road to success."
45. Edward C. Luck, Layers of Security: Regional Arrangements, the United Nations,
and the Japanese-American Security Treaty, ASIAN SURVEY, March 1995, at 247.
46. See generally EDWARD J. LINCOLN, JAPAN'S NEW GLOBAL ROLE (1993).
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